Talk

Of Arab Armies and failing culture

The essay Why Arabs lose wars makes some interesting points about Arab culture which renders their armies incapable of effective function. This essay focussed mainly on the Arab armies of the modern era. Prior to the mid 1900s the notion of an Arab army took a hiatus while the colonial powers quabbled over the region for several hundred years. Still prior to this time the Islamic army (consisting initially of Arabs) did perform quite admirably. Is it fair to say that Arab armies have performed most effectively when organized by tribe? (the armies of the house of Saud in conjunction with their Wahabi priests?). Do the Turks and Persians not fall within the scope of this description?

The same lack of trust operates at the inter-state level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel — that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when the vast majority of planes had been destroyed) — was a classic example of deceit. Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception that included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes). With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises